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Résumé / Abstract 
 
En pr￩sence de m￩canismes de march￩ r￩p￩t￩s avec prix de compensation endog￨nes, c’est-à-
dire lorsque les prix d￩pendent des offres soumises, l’hypoth￨se de l’ind￩pendance des valeurs 
privées – sous-jacente à la compatibilité avec les incitations – est remise en question ; même 
si ce type de mécanismes fournit une participation active et un apprentissage du marché. Dans 
sa vision orthodoxe, un comportement marchand d’adaptation met en p￩ril la compatibilité 
avec  les  incitations.  Lorsque  les  enchérisseurs  opèrent  dans  un  équilibre  corrélé,  nous 
montrons que les contraintes de compatibilité avec les incitations de même que les signaux 
publics issus des autres offres sont prises en compte. De manière à maximiser leur profit 
esp￩r￩, les agents à rationalit￩ limit￩e s’ajustent depuis leur ancrage dans le sens du dernier 
prix signal￩. Ils licitent avec sinc￩rit￩ tant que l’ajustement s’effectue d’apr￨s la pond￩ration 
mémorielle limitée. 
 
Mots clés : enchères, compatibilité avec les incitations, dépendance de rang, 




In repeated-round auction mechanisms with endogenous market-clearing prices, i.e. when 
prices depend on submitted bids, the assumption of independent private values that underlines 
the  property  of  incentive-compatibility  is  to  be  brought  into  question;  even  if  these 
mechanisms provide active involvement and market learning. In its orthodox view, adaptive 
bidding  behavior  imperils  incentive-compatibility.  When  agents  operate  in  a  correlated 
equilibrium,  we  show  that  neither  the  incentive-compatibility  constraints  nor  the  public 
signals issued from others’ bids are ignored. In order to maximize their expected payoffs, 
boundedly rational agents adjust from their anchor in the direction of the last posted price. 
They  bid  sincerely  as  long  as  the  adjustment  is  made  pursuant  to  the  bounded  memory 
weighting 
 
Keywords: auctions; incentive-compatibility; correlated equilibrium; 
anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic; rank-dependence; bounded rationality 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
To know how much an agent is willing to pay for some item, and more generally to assess how 
agents  behave,  economists  learn  from  experiments  of  repeated-round  auctions.  One  of  the 
arguments supportive of repeating auctioning is that practice allows agents to learn about the 
auction format and form values in a market-like setting, which in turn improves the accuracy of 
their estimates (Hayes et al. 1995, Lusk et al. 2001, Alfnes and Rickertsen 2003). Discovered 
preference  hypothesis  (Plott  1996)  says  that  preferences  converge  to  the  same  underlying 
preferences – which are respectful of the expected utility – regardless of the market mechanism. 
These underlying preferences are discovered after agents repeatedly take decisions, receive feed-
back on the outcomes of their decisions, and are given incentives to discover which actions best 
satisfy their preferences. Anomalies to standard theoretical requirements are the results of agents’ 
irrational behaviors, so only later experimental market trials reveal their true preferences. 
In auctioning, experimentalists want to learn from truthful agents. To have them sincere, they use 
the incentive-compatibility constraints, where truthfully stating private information is an optimal 
strategy  for  all  agents  participating  in  the  auction  mechanism.  Incentive-compatibility  is 
dependent on the assumption that agents have independent values. Although different types of 
agents select from a menu of strategies under incomplete information, incentive-compatibility 
forbids the possibility that a given type of agent adjusts her bids to others. However, List and 
Shogren (1999) unearth affiliation between naïve agents for new goods and influence of posted 
prices.  Bernard  (2005)  uncovers  affiliation  but  also  loss  of  the  bidders’  initial  values.  Other 
studies  find  that  the  price  information  alters  the  subjects’  valuation  (Cox  and  Grether  1996, 
Shogren and Hays 1997, Cubitt et al. 2001. Corrigan and Rousu (2006) show by experimentation 
that posted prices have a statistically significant impact on bids submitted in subsequent rounds. 2 
The authors make a distinction between bid affiliation and value affiliation, and prefer the bid 
affiliation as a broader concept; experimentalists observing revealed preferences such as bids, 
bids’ affiliation is more relevant. Finally, Knetsch et al. (2001) report experimental results which 
imply that bids are influenced by observations of past prices and by expectations of future prices. 
They argue that the provision of price information induces cross-subject contamination. Although 
it can simply prove interaction between the learning processes of different subjects, it can most 
likely be the result of imitation. This is all the more unsurprising since, unlike bargaining, posted 
prices are the norm (Hanemann 1994). 
In auctioning, values are drawn from an affiliated distribution when the publicly posted 
market-clearing prices – which signal the relative value of the good – shift the bids’ distribution. 
In this paper, we relax the assumption of private values’ independence in the repeated-round 
mechanisms with exogenous and endogenous market-clearing prices, respectively BDM (Becker-
DeGroot-Marschak) and NPA (random nth-price auction), when prices are made public at the end 
of each round. BDM provides poor market learning, the price being determined separately from 
the bids. As such, bidders have no opportunity to perform in competition that imposes discipline 
on their behavior (Bohm et al. 1997); ergo market anomalies and violations of economic theory 
are fostered (Lusk and Shogren 2007). Yet, only a default of interaction makes the independence 
of  bids  certain,  as  the  probability  of  winning  of  one  agent  does  not  depend  on  the  others’ 
preferences.  On  the  contrary,  under  NPA,  the  distribution  of  prices  depends  on  what  the 
opponents are ready to pay or receive for the good. The nth highest bid will be linked to the 
unknown highest value, hence the agent has to assess her opponents and their expected valuations 
for the good. Although the randomness of the market-clearing price prevents agents from fixing 
on  a  stable  cost  (Shogren  et  al.  2001),  they  are  counter-incited  to  chase  other  bidders’  true 
valuations, which in turn jeopardizes the property of incentive-compatibility. 3 
We prove that when agents play in correlated strategies they neither ignore the incentive-
compatibility constraints nor reject the posted prices issued from  others’ bids. It implies that 
adjusting the bids to the posted prices increases their expected payoffs (given the other players) 
without endangering their truthful bidding. This is our first result. We then employ a behavioral 
approach and show that agents bid according to the anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic. Bidders 
weight serial public signals and adjust from their discovered value using posted prices encoded in 
a bounded memory weighting, that is, they mainly recall the last posted price and their anchor 
(discovered value). This is our second result. Using the anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic in 
time-series forecasting is not new. What is new, on the other hand, is the recourse to anchoring to 
defend truthful bidding. Indeed, why reprehend the adjustment from the anchor if it expresses 
heavy reliance on the freshly discovered preferences? The general hypothesis is that the selection 
among strategies is adaptive, in that a decision maker will choose strategies that are efficient in 
terms of effort and accuracy. Agents are cognitive misers: they tend to choose in the simplest way 
possible (Hanemann 1994). Of particular interest is that under time constraints, heuristics can be 
more accurate than a normative procedure such as expected value maximization (Payne et al. 
1988).  Even  if  our  modus  operandi  confirms  that  agents  are  sincere,  it  also  reveals  that 
auctioneers are boundedly rational utility maximizers. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 clarifies what asocial incentive-compatibility 
is. Section 3 incorporates the incentive-compatibility constraints within strategic interactions and 
the public signals’ reception within the correlated equilibrium. Section 4 presents the behavioral 
adjustment from the anchor based upon a memory weighting register. Section 5 examines the 
empirical validity of such a process. Section 6 concludes. 
 4 
2.  ASOCIAL INCENTIVE-COMPATIBILITY 
An agent faces a payoff rule where  i vp    () i pc   if  i pb    () i pc   and 0 otherwise, with  i v  
being agent i’s value,  i b  ( i c ) her bid (offer) and  p  the market price issued either from the bids 
(offers) or from an exogenous price list. An auction is incentive-compatible when  ii bv   () ii vc   
maximizes the agent’s expected utility payoff. BDM and NPA are theoretically proved to be 
incentive-compatible (Kahneman et al. 1990, Shogren et al. 2001). When an agent i bids, she is 
ignorant of the clearing price. She thus draws its estimate from the probability density function 
() i fp  with support [ , ] pp and the cumulative distribution function  () i Fp, where  [ , ] i b p p  . A 
rational  agent  submits  a  bid  that  maximizes  her  expected  utility  payoff,  which  is  twice 
continuously differentiable and increasing
1 
 




i p i i i b i i p i i i b i E u u v p dF p u dF p u v p f p dp u dp         ,   [1] 
 
The first integral describes the payoff for random prices below her bid (where she expects a 
positive surplus). The second integral describes the payoff for random prices between her bid and 
the maximum possible bid (where she expects a loss). An opposite rule works for offerers. The 
maximum over  i b  occurs when  () i Eu   with respect to  i b  is null or 
 
( )/ ( ) ( ) 0 i i i i i i i E u b u v b f b      ,   [2] 
 
                                                 
1 Assumptions that satisfy the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. 5 
If the agent bids her value, the probability distribution that her bid equals the price is strictly 
positive. Given that the maximization is independent of the other agents’ bids, we name this 
outcome the asocial incentive compatibility. For a uniform distribution of values, the incentive to 
bid their true value is identical for both high and low-type agents in both BDM and NPA (Lusk et 
al. 2007). In other words, the cost of deviating from truthful preferences has equivalent effects in 
both auction mechanisms. Nonetheless, the risk of deviating from truthful bidding is unavoidable 
when  the  clearing  price  is  issued  from  others’  preferences.  Also,  it  is  tricky  to  distinguish 
between refining and imitating, not only for experimentalists but for the agents themselves. 
 
3.  SOCIAL INCENTIVE-COMPATIBILITY 
Standard game theory models prescribe dominant strategies. Incentive-compatibility requires that 
truth telling is best averaged over the types of agents. Each agent has beliefs about the types of 
other agents (how others value the good) which are independent rational expectations, so the 
bidding strategies are constrained not to evolve. 
Consider an agent i with a value  i v . Her beliefs on other agents’ types are independent of 
others’ distribution of beliefs. Let 
*
i   denote the Nash equilibrium pure strategies. The auction 
mechanism specifies the probability  () ii fb that the good is carried by agent i at price  () ii pb. The 
rationality constraint says that the agent’s expected utility payoff function must verify 
 
* ( , ): ( , ) ( , ) 0 i i i i i i i i i i u v f b b p b b        ,     [3] 
 6 
where 
* ( , ) ii    denotes the pure strategy profile  given some strategy of other agents  i  . The 
constraint ensures that the  agent  participates  in the auction in case of nonnegative payoffs . 
Likewise, the incentive-compatibility constraint is such that for each deviation 
* () ii    or  i b 
 
** ( , ( )) ( , ( )): ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i u u v f b b p b b v f b b p b b                     ,     [4] 
 
The left-hand side of the constraint is the expected utility payoff if the agent reports her true bid 
i b , and the right-hand side of this constraint is the expected utility payoff if she deviates to  i b. 
When she bids  i b, her expected payoff changes but the probability distribution over  i b  does not, 
for she cannot control  i b . Henceforth, she affects her expected utility payoff. This constraint 
asserts that her expected  utility payoff from honesty is not less than her expected  utility payoff 
from deviating, i.e. by deviating she can lose. It ensures that the Bayesian Nash equilibrium for 
all agents is to announce the truth. 
If we assume that the agents’ types are unknown, a huge computation requirement comes 
out. Each agent must know the distribution of types of all other agents as well as their ability to 
determine Nash strategies. In reality, equilibrium computation is infeasible. The distribution over 
the possible types in repeated-round auctions is so complex that it makes the space of types go off 
hand. One could eventually calculate the equilibrium, but the absence of common knowledge of 
type space and prior beliefs make it unlikely (Saran and Serrano 2007). As a consequence, it is 
realistic to stress that agents observe how others value the good, and some kind of equilibrium 
emerges (Boutilier et al. 2000). 
When the agent’s valuation depends on both her information and others’ information, 
private signals are likely to mix: a phenomenon known as affiliated values pioneered by Milgrom 7 
and Weber (1982). Agents combine their own signal with the signals received from others, which 
creates affiliation of values (Klemperer 1999). In our case, it means that  ii bb    in  ( , ) i i i i v f b b   . 
Thereby, if a signal from an agent is a high-type, this will increase the probability that other 
agents have high types as well. As a consequence, a higher value for one agent makes higher 
values for other agents more likely (Kagel 1995); the agent tends to submit higher bids afterwards 
(Fox et al. 1998, Cummings and Taylor 1999, List 2001). Indeed, it is hard to believe that the 
agent assigns an independent value to the good after market information has been revealed. Such 
a basic agent is insensitive to interactive implications. When the agent is told the market-clearing 
price, she mostly extracts information on value from it, and price posting makes her update her 
value without fear of deviation. In case of endogenous market-clearing prices, the agent forms 
beliefs on the unknown distribution of bids according to others’ preferences. Even if signals are 
irrelevant to the payoffs, they can find themselves into the equilibrium, which suggests existence 
of a correlated equilibrium (Aumann 1974). Moreover, Bayesian rational agents play a correlated 
equilibrium as long the Harsanyi common prior assumption is verified (Aumann 1987)
2. 
Following Myerson (1983), suppose a standard game with  correlated equilibrium. With 
the signaling from a trusted  third party, i.e. a rightful auction mechanism that communicates 
endogenous market-clearing prices, there is a recommended strategy from public signaling that 




                                                 
2 Common prior only requires the bidders’ mutual beliefs on the fundamentals of the interaction 
be elicited, like expected utility payoffs entailed by the possible actions. 8 
 
    Agent 2 
    fixes  adjusts 
Agent 1 
fixes  1
f v ,  2
f v   1
f v ,  2
a v  
adjusts  1
a v ,  2
f v   0 , 0 
 
Agents expect some payoff from fixing ()
f
i v  or from adjusting ()
a
i v  their true value after 
they discovered it. Agents learn their private recommended strategy from publicly posted prices. 
The posted price randomly recommends strategies   in a way that each pair  12 ( , )
ff vv,  12 ( , )
af vv  
or  12 ( , )
fa vv is recommended with probability 1/3. There is a Nash equilibrium in this game in 
which both agents comply with their recommendations. 
If agent 1 discerns the recommendation  1
f v   from the posted price, she states that agent 2 
has been equiprobably recommended  2
f v  or  2
a v  in which case all her responses yield the same 
expected payoff. If agent 1 discerns  1
a v   from the posted price, agent 2 plays  2
f v  to which she 
best responds by  1
a v . Agent 1 complies with the posted price if agent 2 does alike. Both agents 
conform  to  the  posted  price,  which  equiprobably  randomizes  between  12 ( , )
ff vv,  12 ( , )
af vv   and 
12 ( , )
fa vv and gives the expected payoff allocation of  1 2 1 2 1 2 (1/3)( , ) (1/3)( , ) (1/3)( , )
f f a f a a v v v v v v .  
Recommendations are issued from the probability distribution  f  in  ()  which sets 
probability distributions over the set of pure strategies Φ.  () f   is the probability that a posted 
price recommends the pure strategy profile  () i i N    , where N is the set of agents. When agents 
follow their private recommendations, the expected utility payoff under a correlated strategy  f  9 
is  () i uf  . There is an  incentive-compatible equilibrium when  truthful agents conform to their 
recommendations if and only if 
 
( | ) ( ) ( , ( )| ):
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ),
i i t T i i i i i
i p i i i i i i p i i i i i
u f t f u t
v f b b p b b v f b b p b b
         
   
    
   
 
   [5] 
 
where  ( , ) ii      ,  iN  ,  i tT  ,  : i i i     . If all other agents play their recommended 
actions according to their own types  i   (or  i b ), agent i’s expected utility payoff  i u  from playing 
her type  i tT   while following her private recommendation is  not less than her utility from 
playing an action  as if she were of some other type. Thus,  i b  is the bid which comes out from 
the public  signal given  the agent’s true value  and  i b encapsulates  some  deviant  action.  The 
recommendation is  the best  in  expectation so rational agents comply  with it. The expression 
satisfies the conditional independence property (Forges 1993) necessary in settings of incomplete 
information, given that  () ii  is conditionally independent of  i t . 
  An additional probability constraint is added 
 
( | ) 1 ft     , and  ( | ) 0 ft    ,     ,  tT       [6] 
 
The probability constraint is the conditional probability of the recommended action   if each 
player  reports  her  type  and  : ( ) T    .  The  correlated  equilibrium  which  maximizes  the 
agents’ expected utility payoffs is  1 2 1 2 1 2 ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) 1/3
f f a f f a f v v f v v f v v      and  12 ( , ) 0
aa f v v   . 
The public signal equals a correlated equilibrium if [5] and [6] are satisfied. The single-way 10 
message from a posted price to the agents guarantees asocial valuation which in turn ensures 
truthful bidding. 
 
PROPOSITION 1. When true-type agents follow public signals recommended from endogenous 
market-clearing prices, they operate in a correlated equilibrium. 
 
Proof in Appendix A. 
 
The  correlated  equilibrium  has  the  advantage  of  being  reasonable,  simple  and  is 
guaranteed always to exist. The rationality constraint says that an agent has no reason to bid in 
case  of  null  payoff.  Since  losing  in  auctioning  means  absence  of  payoff,  increasing  the 
expectation of winning the auction and consequently the chance of earning some positive payoff 
by adjusting her true value seems quite rational. In parallel, a rational agent seeks to maximize 
her expected payoff which is the difference between her value and the final cost of the item. If by 
adjusting her true value, an agent increases her expected utility payoff, she seems to act rationally 
quite as much. 
  Altogether, correlated strategies  f  induce a game in which each agent selects her action 
as a function of the  price public signaling. This action cannot depend on  others’ types as the 
recommendation  is  fully  private.  This  ensures  that  the  auction  mechanism  is  incentive-
compatible. Still, how can one distinguish true  from fallacious type when agents  incorporate 
endogenous public signals into their strategies? The next section answers this question. 
 
4.  ANCHORING-AND-ADJUSTMENT 11 
We state that agents start with their anchors and incorporate serial weighted public signals into 
their  bidding  strategies.  We  know  that  agents  use  the  distribution  of  posted  prices  they’ve 
observed at earlier rounds to update their bidding policy and their estimate of the distribution of 
bids. Their bidding strategy in the next round is based on the updated distributions and all agents 
play a Nash equilibrium in a Bayesian manner. If the agent updates her bidding policy based on 
past observations, her bids or offers at early rounds are not reflective of her bids or offers at latter 
rounds,  which  means  that  she  learns  based  on  observations  drawn  from  a  nonstationary 
distribution. It has been shown that myopic learning models such as fictitious play – which is an 
adaptive  heuristic  –  converge  to  a  stationary  distribution  despite  the  initial  nonstationarity 
(Fudenberg  and  Levine  1998).  In  a  fictitious play,  the  agent  is  enabled  to  learn  if  she  can 
realistically win the auction given her true value. She learns by observing the history of past bids 
or offers – prior to the beginning of the next round – and forms a belief about her opponents’ bids 
or offers in the next period. She believes that her opponents are using a stationary strategy which 
is the empirical distribution of past bids or offers, and thus updates her beliefs and her best reply 
based on earlier outcomes, which defies the statement of truth-telling. 
In settings where agents repeatedly interact, an adaptive heuristic is a rule of behavior. 
Anchoring-and-adjustment is a heuristic employed to assess probabilities. Agents start with an 
anchor and make adjustments to reach their estimate
3 (Slovic and Lichtenstein 1971, Tversky and 
Kahneman 1974). For example, agents use this heuristic to forecast business and financial targets 
(Bromiley 1987, Russo and Schoemaker 1989, Andreassen and Kraus 1990, Lawrence and 
O’Connor 1992). They form an estimate of the trustworthiness of the anchor and the data at hand 
                                                 
3  Einhorn and Hogarth (1985) have also considered the anchoring -and-adjustment process to 
describe how people make judgements under ambiguity; their adjustment is made according to 
some probability p which could come from any distribution. 12 
(Gigerenzer et al. 1991). The adjustments from the anchor are meant to increase their expected 
utility payoffs. Arkes et al. (2008) term the adaptation of the reference point  k r  the rule where 
bidders shift their reference point in the direction of a realized outcome. An agent makes her bid 
in  1 k   round, with  1,..., kn  . Depending on whether the price  1 > kk pr   or  1 < kk pr  , she scales 
her bid up and down, respectively. If the price is higher than her anchor, she revises her value and 
her bid upwards to increase her expected utility payoff, given that she learns that she earns a null 
payoff with her previous bid: where she does not maximize any utility. If the price is lower than 
her  anchor, she revises  her value and her bid downwards in order to augment her  expected 
payoff, as she learns that she can adjust her anchor and take part to the winning trades: where she 
maximizes her expected payoff plus obtains an additional gain
4. A rational agent is programmed 
to maximize her  expected  payoff,  so  adjusting  cannot be  irrational.  Besides, we know  that 
strategies based on adaptive heuristics yield boundedly rational strategies in the long run (Hart 
2005). 
Following adaptation upon sequential stimuli  (Hardie et al. 1993) and rank-dependent 
expected utility (Bleichrodt and Pinto 2000), consider the weighting of serial signals.  Linear 
probability weighting corresponds to standard rationality due to indifference to rank-dependence. 
We term indifference to rank-dependence unbounded memory weighting. Fictitious play rests 
upon  such  a  process,  for  the  history  of  all  past  actions  counts.  Conversely,  Tversky  and 
Kahneman (1992) consider the weighting function an s-shaped function due to misperceiving of 
mean probabilities. We term their nonlinear rank-dependence bounded memory weighting. 
                                                 
4 Aumann has argued that rationality should be examined in the context of rules rather than acts, 
i.e. rules of behavior that are better to other rules. 13 
We then proceed from the idea of s-shaped information weighting developed by Baucells 
et  al.  (2010).  Agents  accumulate  ranks  to  constitute  a  bidding  policy  set  up  on  their  serial 
memory
5. In parallel to probability weighting function (Einhorn and Hogarth 1985, Tversky and 
Wakker 1995), assume a weighted memory register. The memory register weights the cumulative 
ranks  according  to  an  increasing  function  () w  ,  where  :[0,1] [0,1] w    with  (0) 0 w    and 
(1) 1 w  . The accumulation departs from the last posted price  (1/ ) n  and ends with the anchor 
( / ) nn.  Unbounded  memory  weighting  stands  for  an  equal  weighting  between  two  rounds
6. 
Following Helson’s (1964) conceptualization, the bid is formulated as 
 
11 (1/ )( )
n
k k k b k b p     ,    [7]  
 
where  k b  is the adjusted bid at rank k, given the anchor  1 b , the linear weighting parameter   and 
the average of past posted prices  1
n
kk p   . 
  The cumulative prospect theory suggests an s-shaped weighting that overweights extreme 
outcomes which occur with small probabilities and underweights average outcomes which occur 
with high probabilities. Bounded memory register overweights the anchor 1 (1 (1/ )) wn   and the 
last  posted  price  (1/ ) wn   and  underweights  the  prices  in-between  (1 (1/ )) (1/ ) w n w n  .  It  is 
steep near 0 and 1 and mild in-between (Figure 1). This formulation can be related to a bounded 
fictitious  play  where  the  beliefs  of  an  agent  depend  on  the  empirical  distribution  of  her 
                                                 
5 Manski (2004) shows that accumulation of empirical evidence over time successively narrows 
the class of feasible outcome distributions, called the identification region. 
6 This approach is different from Forges and Peck (1995) where the information of the agent 
before making her decision consists of the past aggregated bids. 14 
opponent’s most recent actions (Sela and Herreiner 1999). A motivation for bounded recall is the 
observation that a bounded memory length is optimal if all other agents use the same memory 
length (Honkapohja and Mitra 2003). 
  This cognitive process  yields the recency and primacy effects, which clarify that best 
recalls come from the late and early items in a list (Frensch 1994). Numerous examples can be 
found. Investors partially update their reference point after a stimulus is presented to a price 
between the purchasing price and the current price (Spranca et al. 1991, Weber and Camerer 
1998, Baucells et al. 2010)
7; Northcraft and Neale (1987) explain that in real estate management, 
finally agreed prices are significantly affected by the initial bid prices; Hardie  et al. (1993) show 
that consumers give higher weight to recent stimuli than past stimuli; Collins and Barnes (2009) 
show that recent stimulus history creates a running average of anticipatory timing. 
 






We are now in presence of a three-stage weighting such as  
  
1
11 (1 (( 1)/ ) (( 2)/ )( ) ( (1/ ) 0)
n
k h m k k h n b n n b n n p n p   

         ,    [8] 
                                                 
7 Other reference point used by individuals is the historical peak (Gneezy 2005) and expectations 
about future outcomes (Koszegi and Rabin 2006). 15 
 
where  k b   is  the  adjusted  bid  at  rank k,  given the anchor  1 b   highly  weighted  by  h   at  rank 
( 1)/ nn  , the last posted price  n p  highly weighted by  h   at rank  (1/ ) n , and the average of 






   moderately weighted by  m   at rank ( 2)/ nn  . 
The agent is bidding truthfully if she repeats a sincere bid both in  1 k   and k. In our case, 
the agent will adjust her bid in the direction of the last posted price. We deal with endogenously 
cleared posted prices issued from anybody’s bid, so linear weighting meant to reveal rationality 
(Van de Kuilen 2009) no longer holds. Literature states that truth-telling is rational and affiliating 
private values on public signaling is not. While we consider discovered preferences hypothesis to 
reveal the agent’s anchor, we assert that adjusting the anchor up to the last posted price does not 
threaten  truthful  bidding.  We  know  that  the  adjustment  from  a  precise  anchor  results  in  a 
moderate update (Janiszewski and Uy 2008). In our case, high weighting of the anchor stands for 
high  regard  to  discovered  preferences.  Likewise,  adjustment  means  an  adaptive  rule  that 
maximizes the expected payoff (given the other players), which is the only purpose that matters 
to rationality. The two suggest that sincere agents are boundedly rational. Once an agent has 
discovered her preferences, she is considered insincere if she scales her anchor in line with the 
unbounded memory register, where the sequence of prices drowns her anchor. 
 
PROPOSITION 2. An agent is truth-telling inasmuch as she plays pursuant to the bounded memory 
weighting, i.e. so long as she behaves as a boundedly rational utility payoff maximizer. 
 
Proof in Appendix B. 
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The correlation between private signals comes from the commonly observed history of 
play and best responses are determined by the history of public signals. If agents confine their 
adjustment  from  the  anchor  to  the  latest  posted  price,  we  consider  that  they  play  truthfully. 
Bounded memory weighting is a way to reflect such a bidding strategy
8. While agents would be 
regarded as irrational in the standard literature, we consider sincere bidders boundedly rational. 
 
5.  EMPIRICAL TEST 
Let us now test the empirical relevance of our propositions. We reprocess the home-grown data 
from  the  BDM  and  NPA  experiments  on  carbon  offset  realized  by  Dragicevic  and  Ettinger 
(2010). In their experiments, agents bought and sold certificates of one ton of carbon offset over 
ten rounds by means of willingness-to-pay (WTP) and willingness-to-accept (WTA). We decide 
to analyze the data from the five (out of ten) last rounds because we consider agents to have 
discovered their preferences after four practice rounds for sure (see Table 1); if agents are to 
compute their bids or offers from untruthful types, they most likely do it from this point of time. 
Because market-clearing prices are exogenous under BDM, unbounded memory weighting does 
not compromise incentive-compatibility. If all posted prices are uniformly weighted, subjects are 
at worst naïve, for it is irrational to run after luck. The market-clearing price is endogenously 
chosen under NPA, so the value of the good is worth somebody’s value. If every posted price is 
uniformly weighted, subjects are insincere because they are explicitly copying the others’ values. 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics of the unbounded and bounded memory estimates 
                                                 
8 Contrary to Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) we do not use all available information nor do we 






According to [7] and [8], we estimate the bids and offers of the subsequent round subject 
to the unbounded and bounded memory weightings using one-parameter factors from Tversky 
and  Kahneman  (1992):  1   ,  0.61 m     and  0.69 h     for  the  linear,  moderate  and  high 
weightings. We employ linear  (1/ ) n   rather than power  (1/ ) n
  factoring, for the anchor gets 
underweighted otherwise. We normalize the sequential weights to one in order to compute  the 
anchors from which bids and offers are figured out, and compare them to real data (Table 2). 
  Our first investigation reveals that within BDM, only 26% of offerers and 22% of bidders 
fix their anchor. Within NPA, these figures even collapse to 13% for both offerers and  bidders. 
The bidding is thus in motion until the last round. To see whether agents base strategies upon the 
posted  prices’  adjustment,  we  study  the  average  adjustment  in  bids  and  offers  between  two 
rounds. We look at Student’s t distribution between experimental and theoretical data and regard 
whether they fit. With NPA and under both weighting mechanisms, the theoretical adjustments in 
bids and offers are not significantly different from the real adjustments in bids and offers. The t-
test  fails  to  reject  the  null  hypothesis  that  the  theoretical  adjustments  in  offers  and  the  real 
adjustments in offers come from the same distribution at the  <0.05 p  level. With BDM, under 
both weighting mechanisms, the theoretical adjustments in offers are not significantly different 
from the real adjustments in offers either. We do not reject the null hypothesis that the theoretical 
and  experimental  data  are  equal  at  the  5%  level  of  a t-test.  On the  contrary, the theoretical 18 
adjustments in bids are significantly different from the real adjustments under both weightings. 
Here we reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level of a t-test. The estimated distributions do not fit 
with the real BDM bidding distribution. 
  Residuals are then compared. In the first place, we examine the average WTA estimates. 
Under BDM, we notice that the average bounded memory SSE (6.67; 24% less than one) is lower 
than the average unbounded memory SSE (12.62; 4% less than one), showing that the offerers are 
sincere and weight their anchors heavily. Under NPA, the average bounded memory 
SSE (9.33; 33% less than one) is lower than the average unbounded memory SSE (13.17; 30% 
less than one), which suggests truthful offering. The values of the two weighting mechanisms are 
close, which is  unsurprising since market  prices are issued from  the  offers. We see  that the 
difference between refining and imitating is thin but real. After that, we observe the average WTP 
bids. Under BDM, we see that the average bounded memory SSE (5.82; 41% less than one) is 
lower than the average unbounded memory SSE (10.61; 30% less than one), showing that bidders 
weight their anchors enough to remain sincere. Under NPA, the average bounded memory SSE 
(5.65; 23% less than one) is lower than the average unbounded memory SSE (6.85; 18% less than 
one), which means truthful bidding. The difference shows that they incorporate posted prices to 
increase their expected payoff. 
  We then regress on the anchor and the list of posted prices, which allows us to obtain 
respective   -factors and compare them to those of Tversky and Kahneman. The least squares 
regression results are presented in Table 2. All estimates are significant, i.e. all p-values amount 
less than 0.001, and all R-squares are higher than 0.9. Despite their comparability, each market 
side  has  its  own  factor.  We  do  not  identify  m    in  bounded  memory  weighting;  the  factor 
oscillates around zero and is not significant. 19 
 






  The average bounded memory weighting from the  -factors is illustrated in Figure 2. All 
the weight is distributed between the anchor and the last posted price, with a massive regard 
given to the anchor, which proves the agents’ sincerity as well as the relevance of our model. We 
denote that the average SSE is higher on the offerers’ side than on the bidders’ side. This is due 
to loss aversion of some agents, who systematically proposed a ceiling WTA. When we ignore 
them, the average SSE is similar between both market sides.  
   






We observe an overvaluation of  -factors compared to those from Tversky and Kahneman. The 
overvaluation cannot arise in elicitation procedures which are deficient in social interactions, so 
this bears quantitative evidence to the effects arisen from the interactions. The average theoretical 20 
WTP and WTA are beneath the average real bids and offers under both auction mechanisms. 
Their  overstatement  could  result  from  the  combination  of  regret  and  competitive  pressure. 
Disappointment  aversion  (Horowitz  2006)  says  that  a  bidder  overbids  because  she  is  more 
disappointed from not receiving the good than from receiving it overpriced.  Likewise, WTA 
posted prices incorporate behavioral effects of loss aversion and disposition (Weber and Camerer 
1998), which operate like a catalyst. The likeness of factors suggests a similar magnitude of 
effects on both market sides.  
By means of correlated strategies, we showed that adjusting was impulsed by the pursuit 
of higher expected payoff (given the other players). Let us verify this. We compare the expected 
percentage of agents who obtain a positive payoff by fixing their anchor and those who adjust up 
to  the  last  market-clearing  price  with  real  data.  The  results  presented  in  Table  3  show  that 
adjusting pays, since both expected and real adjusting gainers outnumber. 
 






Second, we measure up the average expected payoffs with and without adjustment with 
real payoffs with and without adjustment. The results are presented in Table 4. We observe that 
adjusting is in general gainful, for only BDM offerers are penalized for having moved from their 
anchor; this is unsurprising in view of the fact that the exogenous market-clearing price makes it 21 
a naïve strategy. Within NPA, adjusting from the discovered value upon the last posted price paid 
in both expected and real scenarios. 
 






6.  CONCLUSIONS 
The validity of incentives for truthful valuation is questioned whenever an agent’s probability of 
winning depends on the moves of others, such as with the endogenous market-clearing price 
auctions. Does it imply that the data obtained from experiments with endogenous market-clearing 
prices  are  unusable  because  of  the  risk  of  bids’  affiliation?  It  amounts  to  saying  that 
experimentalists have to choose between the absence of market learning with exogenous market-
clearing price auctions and the risk of dependence of private values that exists under NPA. 
In repeated-round auctions, the private-value-independence assumption behind incentive-
compatibility may be unrealistic and malapropos. When the bids’ adjustments get correlated, the 
observed bid for a good after a round impacts the estimated price of the good at the next round. 
Agents revise their beliefs to reflect this publicly revealed information. We show that they start 
their valuation with an intrinsic anchor – their first true reference point – and then adjust this 
value using public signals encoded in a memory weighting register. Our empirical test confirms 
the capacity of auction mechanisms to be demand-revealing. Contrary to other studies, our work 22 
shows that accounting for posted prices without rejecting the incentive-compatibility constraints 
differentiates  sincere  from  insincere  bidding  or  offering.  Incentive-compatibility  need  not  be 
excluded in presence of adjustment from the anchor, as long as one verifies heavy weighting of 
the anchor. Ultimately, instead of condemning behaviors that tie in, we believe that the  best 
approach  is  to  investigate  conditions  under  which  incentive-compatibility  constraints  can  be 
maintained. The notion of truth, which is contingent on human perception, convention, and social 
experience, should be reformulated. We suggest a form of social rationality where the correlated 
equilibrium plays a key role. 
 
APPENDIX A: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1 
 
Suppose an initial reference value  i v  ( 1,2 i  ). The last posted price amounts  ii pv . Agent i 
faces an equiprobable trend of the market value, i.e. bullish  i v    or bearish  i v   . She can 
adjust her anchor according to the last posted price in the next round. We have two cases. In spite 
of the posted price, the anchor of agent i is not updated and remains at  i v . The expected value of 
payoff is 
 
(1/3)[( ( ) (1/2)( ) (1/2)( )] (1/3)
f
i i i i i i i v v v v v v v               . 
 
The anchor is updated to  i v    due to the last posted price. The expected value of payoff is 
 
(1/3)[( ) ( ) (1/2)( ( )) (1/2)( ( ))] (1/3)
a
i i i i i i i v v v v v v v                     . 23 
 
One can see that 
af
ii vv  , which implies an expected payoff from adjusting at least as high as that 
from fixing the anchor. Now consider the following game payoff matrix. The market-clearing 
price, which determines the respective payoffs, is endogenous and issued from the bids. Agent i 





    fixes  adjusts 
Agent 1  fixes  (1/3) , (1/3)    ( 1/6) , (1/6)    
adjusts  (1/6) , ( 1/6)       0,0 
 
She chooses either to fix the anchor 
f
i v  or to adjust from her anchor to the last posted price: 
a
i v . 
An agent who adjusts but hopes that the other agent fixes her anchor expects a positive payoff of 
(1/2)( ) (1/3)( ) (1/6)     ;  conversely,  she  expects  ( 1/6)    if  she  fixes  her  anchor 
while  the  other  agent  adjusts.  Finally,  when  bids  converge,  agents  face  a  null  payoff,  as  it 
amounts the difference between the private value and the market-clearing price. 
  The third party sends private recommendations. There is a correlated equilibrium if no 
agent refuses to follow her recommendation. If the row agent receives the signal "adjust" given 
she has no chance to win some positive payoff by fixing her anchor, she has no incentive not to 
follow, because adjusting is better in expectation. The row agent assigns a positive conditional 
probability of 1/2 to each of the two pairs of  signals (fix, adjust) and (adjust, adjust). If the 
column agent follows the same rule, the (uncorrelated) expected payoff of the mixed strategy 
equilibrium by fixing and adjusting respectively yields 
 24 
(1/2)[ (1/3) , (1/3) ] (1/2)[ ( 1/6) , ( 1/6) ] [ (1/12) , (1/12) ]           . 
 
(1/2)[ (1/6) , (1/6) ] (1/2)[0,0] [ (1/12) , (1/12) ]      . 
 
Therefore, agent i is at least as good by adjusting, that is, she is better-off by not letting the other 
agent adjust at her expense. The game being symmetrical, the column agent has no incentive to 
ignore her recommendation either. Both agents end up adjusting.  
  An  agent  never  refuses  to  follow  the  recommendation  in  case  of  increased  expected 
payoff. The correlated equilibrium yields the following expected payoff 
 
(1/3){[ (1/3) , (1/3) ] [ ( 1/6) , (1/6) ] [ (1/6) , ( 1/6) ]} [ (1/9) , (1/9) ]              . 
 
The correlated equilibrium yields probabilities of 1/3 to each combination that yields a positive 
outcome. The expected payoff amounts to  (1/9) , which dominates the expected payoff of the 
mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in case of ()    and dominates the expected payoff of the pure 
strategy of fixing in case of ()   . Therefore, agent i takes the price into account, making the bids 
affiliated.                    
 
APPENDIX B: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2  
 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2. Think of a low-type agent and posted prices issued from high-type 
agents, such that prices exceed the anchor. Rewriting [7] with  1 () kk v b b , meaning that the 25 
value equals the anchor, the unbounded memory weighting yields un update at k round such that 
11 (1/ ) ( )
n
k m k k b k b p      thus  1 (1/ ) (1/ ) (1 (1/ ) )
n



















As  1 ( 1) 1 m k     ,  1 (1/ )
n
k m k k v k p    ,  that  is,  the  agent’s  anchor  equals  the  average  of 
posted prices. This is incompatible with the demand-revealing property, in particular if public 
signals come from high-type agents. 
  If we rewrite [8] with  1 () kk v b b  the bounded memory weighting yields an update of 
1
11 (1 (( 1)/ ) (( 2)/ )( ) (1/ )
n
k h m k k h n b n n b n n p n p   

          which  now corresponds  to a  value 
k v  that amounts 
1
1 (1 (( 1)/ )) (1/ ) (( 2)/ )( )
n
h k h n m k k n n v n p n n p   

       . After we develop and 
factor, the expression equals 
1
1 (1 ) (1/ )( ) (( 2)/ )( )
n
k k h h k n m k k v v n v p n n p   

        . Finally, 
the equation yields 
1
1 (1 (1/ )) (1/ ) (( 2)/ )( )
n
h k h n m k k v n n p n n p   





1 (1/ ) (( 2)/ )
(1 (1/ ))
n
h n m k k
k
h












The anchor’s increment 1 (1/ ) n   and its high weighting  h   determine the agent’s value which is 
not captured by the sequential market-clearing prices. Regarding our low-type agent that receives 
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Table 1 Summary statistics of the unbounded and bounded memory estimates 
    WTP bids  WTA offers 
Auction mechanism  nth round  7  8  9  10  7  8  9  10 
                   
BDM  First bid or offer (5th round)         8.29            8.29            8.29            8.29            8.92            8.92            8.92            8.92    
  Last posted price (n – 1)          1.50            5.00            6.50          13.50            1.50            5.00            6.50          13.50    
  Average real bid or offer         8.39            8.71            8.82            8.61            9.53            9.19            8.67            8.03    
        Average adjustment between two rounds           0.32         0.11       –0.21         –0.35       –0.56       –1.05 
  Unbounded memory average estimate         7.92            7.20            7.06            8.15            8.13            7.35            7.18            8.25    
        Average adjustment between two rounds         –0.72       –0.14         1.09           0.78       –0.17         1.07 
        t-test* of adjustments between two rounds                    7.24         1.34       –3.87                     1.19          –0.49          –5.02    
        Average SSE
9 (residual)         7.10          10.39           12.19          12.77          10.87          12.81          12.96          13.83    
  Bounded memory average estimate         7.88            7.53            7.47            8.24            8.23            7.85            7.77            8.53    
        Average adjustment between two rounds         –0.35       –0.06         0.77         –0.38       –0.08         0.76 
         t-test* of adjustment between two rounds                   5.04            0.98          –2.98                      0.08          –0.69          –4.11    
        Average SSE (residual)         3.85            5.49            6.62            7.33            6.56            7.17            5.90            7.04    
                   
NPA  First bid or offer (5th round)         4.77         4.77         4.77         4.77         9.86            9.86            9.86            9.86 
  Last posted price (n – 1)         1.50            8.51            7.84            7.03          10.00            5.00            5.88            7.96    
  Average real bid or offer         6.18            6.12            6.85            6.72            9.17            9.14            9.23            9.37    
        Average adjustment between two rounds         –0.06            0.73       –0.12         –0.03         0.09         0.14 
  Unbounded memory average estimate         4.14            5.33            5.83            6.04            9.11            8.09            7.65            7.71    
        Average adjustment between two rounds           1.19            0.50            0.21                   –1.02          –0.44         0.07 
        t-test* of adjustments between two rounds         –2.41           0.67          –0.60                  3.19            2.06            0.09    
        Average SSE (residual)         7.78            5.06            6.64            7.92          10.80            9.90          12.36          19.62    
  Bounded memory average estimate         4.37            5.21            5.50            5.60            9.39            8.64            8.37            8.42    
        Average adjustment between two rounds           0.84         0.29         0.10         –0.76       –0.26         0.05 
         t-test* of adjustments between two rounds            –1.77            0.50          –0.40                2.66            1.42            0.10    
        Average SSE (residual)         6.41            4.22            5.84            6.14            8.66            6.56            7.27          14.81    
 
* H0: The difference between experimental and theoretical average adjustments is zero at 5% significance.  
                                                 
9 SSE: the sum of the squares of the residuals. 34 
Table 2  -factors statistics 
 estimate
10  Unbounded memory weighting    Bounded memory weighting 
  BDM  NPA    BDM  NPA 
Bidders  1.18 (0.02)  1.24 (0.03)    1.24 (0.03)  1.16 (0.06) 
Offerers  1.19 (0.02)  1.17 (0.03)    1.15 (0.03)  1.21 (0.07) 
 
 
Table 3 Expected and real gainers from adjustment 
per cent  BDM WTP  BDM WTA  NPA WTP  NPA WTA 
Expected gainers  2.63  4.17  10.00  10.94 
Real gainers  0.00  2.78  3.33  3.13 
 
 
Table 4 Expected and real gains from adjustment 
on average  BDM WTP  BDM WTA  NPA WTP  NPA WTA 
Expected gain  0.13  –0.36  0.72  0.09 
Real gain  0.13  –0.22  0.26  0.08 
 
   
                                                 










Figure 2 Average bounded memory weighting 
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